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Abstract
The problem of managing peak electricity demand is of significant importance to utility
providers. In Ontario, electricity consumption achieves its peak during the afternoon hours
in summer. Electricity generation units are provisioned for these few days of the year,
which is expensive. In the past, researchers have studied several approaches to curb peak
electricity demand by providing consumers with incentives to reduce their load.
We study using non-cash (or behavioral) incentives to motivate consumers to set their
thermostats a few degrees higher during the summer, thereby reducing aggregate peak
demand. Such incentives exploit cognitive biases and find their foundations in behavioral
economics and psychology. We mathematically model the effect of non-cash incentives
using utility functions. To build an accurate utility model, we devise and conduct a large-
scale survey to elicit consumers’ behavioral preferences. At a high level, we propose an
analytical Big-Data based approach to evidence-based policy design, where a mechanism
design framework uses a data-driven utility model to inform incentive policies.
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In this thesis we propose, study, and validate non-cash policies to reduce electricity usage
during peak load hours in residential buildings. The basic approach is to craft energy
policies that exploit psychological inclinations or biases in humans. By doing so, we argue
that we can modify electricity usage behavior and help reduce consumption during peak
load hours.
Electricity consumption in Ontario exhibits cyclic patterns of highs and lows during
the day and the year. Usage typically increases as the day starts and progresses into the
afternoon. It peaks sometime in the afternoon, then gradually decreases as the evening
approaches. A second smaller spike is seen in the evening when people come back home
from work, which then gradually decreases and attains a low point during the night. The
exact times when such changes in the load profile occur, depends on several factors such
as the day of the week, and the season. However, in Ontario, the general shape of the
load profile is relatively constant [52], and the highest demand is observed during summer
afternoons. Since these peak demand days do not occur at other times of the year, utility
companies either have to maintain an over-provisioned generation infrastructure or pur-
chase electricity from neighboring states or provinces (say) to meet this demand.
One approach to alleviate this problem, has been the employment of demand response
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strategies. Demand response is defined as: “Changes in electric usage by end-use customers
from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity
over time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized” [19]. Among demand
response strategies, the use of a time-varying price to control electricity usage in home and
buildings is widely used. Essentially, the approach is to increase the price of electricity
during periods where the utility companies seek to reduce demand. Several approaches
such as time-of-use pricing, critical peak pricing, real-time pricing, and peak-time rebates
are well known and are discussed by Newsham et al. in a comprehensive review [48]. A
review of these approaches can also be found in the survey in [49].
An analysis of the use of prices to control electricity consumption reveals that it suffers
from the following intrinsic problems:
• By having customers manually control demand in response to price signals, it puts
the customer into a decision-making loop. This is onerous because most consumers
are unaware of the power drawn by various appliances, and so do not know how best
to reduce their demand.
• Due to the human in the control loop, prices cannot be changed very rapidly. For
instance, time-of-use prices are typically changed every six months. Even real-time
pricing changes only hourly. Grid peaks, however, can develop in a matter of seconds
or minutes. Therefore, price-based control is not always effective.
• The typical savings from changing behavior amounts only to a few dollars per month.
So, it is not sufficient to induce any significant change in usage behavior.
For these reasons, we believe that the traditional price-based approach to controlling
electricity usage is inadequate. Instead, we study the use of non-cash (or behavioral) in-
centives for inducing a change in consumption pattern.
We are strongly motivated by two phenomena. First, electronic platforms and social
media are bringing the world together. The social and geographical barriers that were pre-
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viously required to be crossed to spread an idea are falling. This may provide the thrust
that may be needed for non-cash incentives based on a desire for social recognition to be
widely adopted! Second, smart grids make it feasible to communicate with and control
electrical equipment without manual intervention. This enables the design of policies that
do not need participants to be personally involved: only initial consent is needed. These
two developments make behavioral policies inexpensive to implement, with the potential
for huge gains.
We are also motivated by the fact that most prior work on policy-making based on
behavioral changes has been experimental [14]. While such experimental studies do show
the effectiveness of behavioral incentives, they conduct little analysis about quantitative
results from the implementation of these policies. Specifically, researchers in the past have
shown that behavioral incentives are effective and that behavioral policies should be ex-
ploited in policy-making [15]. In contrast, we quantify the value received by an individual
when a particular policy is implemented. This helps us select the best set of policies to
implement.
We focus on non-cash incentives for controlling peak demand during summer after-
noons, by encouraging homeowners to set their thermostat a few degrees higher. We
model behavioral incentives using utility functions and design an agent-based game the-
oretic model. We use this model to investigate agents’ participation as a function of the
design parameters. To build a realistic utility function, we conduct a survey of our target
population to elicit preferences regarding proposed policies and discomfort anticipated due
to higher thermostat settings. A major contribution of our work has been designing a
survey questionnaire that provides us with data to experiment with a variety of schemes
for non-cash incentives, while proposing policy measures with appropriate communication
and control protocols.
In our work, we try to answer the following questions: How effective are non-cash
incentives in the context of demand response? Which incentives or biases are better than
others, and if so, for what sections of the population? How do we quantify the reduction
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in electricity that would be seen if we implement a certain behavioral policy? And, in
general, how do we decide what kind of policies would work, before we spend a significant
sum of money implementing them on the larger population? This thesis aims to answer
these questions.
Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
• We design and recommend a set of behavioral policies geared towards increasing
penetration of the peaksaver PLUS program in Ontario (this scheme is described in
Chapter 2).
• We devise a game theoretic framework and carry out large-scale data-driven prefer-
ence elicitation; leveraging these to design a computational (empirical) mechanism.
We call this approach Big Data Mechanism Design.
• We propose a game theoretic model that accounts for an agent’s overall utility re-
ceived from behavioral biases and thermal discomfort.
• We design and conduct a large-scale survey on a crowdsourcing platform called
CrowdFlower. The survey elicits respondents’ preferences regarding behavioral biases
and thermal discomfort.
• We propose and implement a novel post hoc survey cleaning methodology. This
method can be used for selecting questions that best measure a particular subjective
variable, if we have multiple questions that all aim to elicit data about the same
variable.
• We evaluate and compare profits from inclusion or exclusion of various behavioral
policies in the implemented policy set.
• We find that if the utility companies implement our proposed policies, they can ben-
efit the equivalent energy savings of raising the thermostats of the entire population
by 2◦C. The projected energy savings can be up to 78% higher if the utility com-
panies raise thermostat settings in a customized way, based on each participant’s
preferences. We, therefore, recommend that our survey be carried out on a large
scale to identify and target sections of the population accordingly.
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we discuss the relevant
background and related work. In Chapter 3, we present a game theoretic framework that
captures the policy design process, and instantiate the model with the peaksaver PLUS
program. To elicit agents’ preferences, we design and conduct a survey – the details of
which are covered in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we analyze the data from the survey, lay
down the principles for interpreting the survey data, and draw inferences from our model
based on the data. Finally, we discuss the conclusions of our study in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
Our work explores behavioral biases and their incorporation into energy policies. In this
chapter, we present concepts, definitions, and related work.
2.1 The peaksaver PLUS Program
We chose the peaksaver PLUS program to contextualize and instantiate our model for
policy design. peaksaver PLUS is designed to reduce electricity demand. It is offered by
several electricity distribution companies in Ontario, Canada; and is funded by the Ontario
Power Authority. This program allows the system operator to send signals and control the
household’s central air conditioning system and electric water heater during peak demand
hours using a radio-controlled programmable digital thermostat. It has been shown to
reduce peak demand for the province of Ontario and also saves money for the consumer
by reducing their electricity consumption. The programmable thermostat is installed for
free in volunteering homes. Additionally, as a perk, the peaksaver PLUS program also
provides participating homes with an in-home energy display device that provides real-
time information about their rate of consumption, the peak price, and the monthly and
daily projections of their electricity bill.
Typically, the peaksaver PLUS thermostat is activated during hot summer days, from
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May 1 to September 30, on weekdays (never on weekends and holidays), between 12 noon
and 7 p.m. The thermostat temperatures are generally set up to 2◦C higher [6, 7]. Such
adjustments are executed in batches of activation, each one of which may last for up
to four hours. The peaksaver PLUS program has been shown to be very effective, with
Enersource Hydro Mississauga Inc. claiming that the program can lower a household’s
electricity consumption by one to two kilowatt-hours [6]. Historically, between 2011 and
2014, peaksaver PLUS saved 410,345 kWh of peak load electricity, and was reported to
have 54,451 participants in 2013 [45].
2.2 Preliminaries in Behavioral Economics
Much has been said and written about the irrationality of human behavior [16, 17, 43].
An entire branch of economics called Behavioral Economics studies the consequences of
irrationality in human behavior and decision-making. Behavioral Economics advocates
that human beings are irrational, and contradicts the dogma that humans are rational and
always work in their best interests.
2.2.1 Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are the psychological phenomena that human irrationality can be at-
tributed to [16, 17]. In the context of our study, we treat cognitive biases as non-cash
incentives that may modify consumer behavior. Since cognitive biases are fundamental
predispositions in the decision-making process of humans, in utility theory, we model cog-
nitive biases as imparting some non-negative utility to a biased decision-maker. 1 Given
this interpretation, cognitive biases can be regarded as incentives. Hereafter, we will be
using the terms non-cash incentives, behavioral incentives, behavioral biases, and cognitive
biases interchangeably.
1We can make this assumption because, in our model, an individual is never penalized due to the effect
of these biases.
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In this work, we investigate the usage of four biases in policy-making. Three of these
are cognitive biases, and the fourth one is a motivational technique called Gamification.
Although, in the literature, gamification is not modeled as a bias, for the sake of consistency
in expression, from here on we will refer to gamification also as a bias. We define these
biases as follows:
Status Quo Bias
Status quo bias is a cognitive bias that represents an agent’s tendency to prefer the current
state of affairs or the status quo to any change [35, 36, 53]. For example, behaviors such
as students sitting at the same seats for lectures, and people not switching their default
mobile ringtone are attributed to the status quo bias [43].
Commitment Devices
Commitment devices refer to an agent’s commitment to abide by a future course of action
so as to produce a desired result, usually to avoid being tempted into taking actions that
might be undesirable. Quoting Bryan et al. from [21], for example, “Not keeping alcohol
in the house,” and “Only taking a fixed amount of cash when heading out to party for a
night,” are examples of commitment devices at work.
Social Norms
Social norms are standards set by the society that individuals who are a part of the society
generally tend to follow [23, 51]. For example, conforming with dining etiquettes, tipping
the waiter, queuing up patiently for one’s turn, are all examples of social norms.
Gamification
Gamification refers to the introduction of fundamental elements of game design into non-
game contexts [26]. In other words, gamification refers to turning non-game contexts into
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games. Some examples are – Facebook Likes, karma points on online forums like Reddit,
and marks or grades in the academic system.
2.3 Discomfort Modeling
Our work investigates the awarding of incentives to increase participation in the peaksaver
PLUS program. This program inherently causes additional thermal discomfort, because
a system operator sends signals to control a participating household’s air conditioning
system. Therefore, it is important that we accurately model thermal discomfort.
2.3.1 Predicted Mean Vote and ASHRAE’s Standard
Fanger’s Predicted Mean Vote (PMV) model [27] is used to calculate a numerical value
that represents the average human’s comfort level in a certain thermal environment. PMV
is computed as a function of air temperature, radiant temperature, air speed, and humidity
of the environment, along with the person’s clothing and physical activity level.
The ASHRAE Standard 55 [58] is a standardized scale used for measuring an environ-
ment’s thermal comfort for human occupancy. According to the standard, if the PMV,
calculated from the environmental and personal parameters, is between −0.5 and 0.5, the
thermal environment is deemed to be comfortable.
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 The peaksaver Program and Behavioral Energy Policies
Singla et al. proposed a payment-based incentive scheme called smartset, that offered
monetary rewards to consumers for participating in the peaksaver program (a predecessor
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of peaksaver PLUS ) [56]. In [59], Sugarman et al. investigated and compared end-
user response to time-of-use pricing and the peaksaver program; showing that while the
peaksaver program can be potentially very effective, in its current form it is not attractive
to consumers. This, coupled with a dearth of research on the use of behavioral incentives
for promoting adoption of the peaksaver PLUS program, motivates our present study.
Allcot et al., in their work [14], outline the importance of implementing behavioral biases
in energy policies. In particular, they stress the relevance of framing and psychological
cues, commitment devices, default options (status quo bias), and social norms, in energy
policies. Experimental use of behavioral energy policies has also been adopted in several
pilot programs initiated by a company called OPOWER, in the United States [15,40]. Our
work extends on these propositions and conducts detailed quantitative analysis using data
from consumers.
2.4.2 Psychometric Survey Design
To build a realistic and practical model of the degree to which irrational behavior can
be exploited to mitigate thermal discomfort, we need to conduct psychometric surveys
that can measure behavioral biases and the tolerance for thermal discomfort. This section
presents previous work on psychometric scales that measure various aspects of human be-
havior and biases. Such standardized scales are universally accepted psychological research
to measure specific aspects of human psychology and behavior. An established scale re-
quires strict adherence to the exact set of questions as recommended by the developers of
the scale. Of course, these questions may not necessarily be a perfect fit for the research
question at hand, in which case, a fresh questionnaire may be designed to elicit the required
information, as we did. We now discuss some standardized psychometric scales 2 that are
related to eliciting behavioral preferences or patterns. 3
2Developed by separate research groups, these scales are mutually incompatible. For example, some
scales measure values on a single dimensional space, while others measure values in a multi-dimensional
space.
3Further details on the psychometric scales, including example questions, can be found in Appendix B.
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Social Comparison Scale
The social comparison scale [54] deals with two distinctive underlying dimensions of social
comparisons: (a) comparisons of abilities referring to the question “How am I doing as
compared to others?”, and (b) comparisons of opinions referring to the question “How do
my feelings/thoughts compare to those of others?”
HEXACO & the Big Five Inventory Scales
The HEXACO [41] and the Big Five Inventory [33] scales claim to measure fundamental
personality traits along different dimensions. The Big Five Inventory measures person-
ality traits along the five dimensions of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, Openness. The set of personality traits considered by the HEXACO scale is
a superset of the Big Five Inventory, with the additional dimension of Honesty-Humility.
This additional dimension represents traits like manipulative behavior for personal gain,
temptation to break rules, lack of interest in lavish wealth and luxuries, feeling no special
entitlement to elevated social status, etc.
Self-Monitoring Scale
Self-monitoring scale [42] measures the respondent’s sensitivity to the expressive behavior
of others, and their ability to modify self-presentation.
Self-Efficacy Scale
Jerusalem and Schwarzer devised the General Self-efficacy scale [55]. The scale consists




The self-control scales, proposed in [60], look quite relevant; particularly because commit-
ment bias is known to be linked with the ability to overcome temptations [21].
Heuristics and Biases Scale
This scale [57] has questions that elicit information about Hindsight bias, Conjunction
fallacy, Planning fallacy, Halo effect, Phenomenon of rare Events, Overconfidence bias,
and Susceptibility to priming.
Need for a Scale for Biases
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing psychometric scales for measuring pref-
erences on social norms, commitment bias, status quo bias, and gamification. The social
comparison scale is a well-cited measurement scale for social comparisons, but it does not
directly measure peer pressure. The conscientiousness dimension on the HEXACO scale
can be argued to be closely related to commitment bias, but without any strong grounds.
The self-monitoring scale and self-efficacy scale are also not applicable for measuring the
biases that we consider in our study. The heuristics and biases scale does measure some
cognitive biases, but not the ones we need. Moreover, since using an established scale re-
quires us to use its recommended questionnaire, these scales are not relevant in the context
of our problem statement. Thus, we have a need to develop a standardized measurement
scale for measuring social norms, commitment bias, status quo bias, and gamification. We
do so in Chapter 3.
2.4.3 Big Data and Mechanism Design
In [64], Wellman discusses empirical game-theoretic analysis for games that do not have
tractable computational or theoretical solution strategies. For such games, Wellman treats
the game simulator as the primary source of input and performs strategic reasoning through
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a combination of simulation and game-theoretic analysis. Vorobeychik et al., in their
work [61–63], study the broad topic of computational mechanism design where exact the-
oretical analysis is intractable. In particular, Vorobeychik et al. substitute players and
their payoff profiles with simulation-based game models, provide Nash equilibrium approx-
imation solution and investigate its convergence results for particular game types such as
infinite simulation-based games.
Our work differs from simulation-based mechanism design in the fact that we do not
obtain value functions from simulations; rather we investigate and elicit data regarding
value functions from human participants using a survey. Depending on the nature of the
data and results from our analyses, we make appropriate modeling assumptions about the
agents’ type distribution, and tractably solve our mechanism design problem.
Overall, there has been limited research on designing empirical mechanisms based on
a large volume of elicited data from human participants. With big data analytics, policy
makers can hugely benefit from data-based computational mechanisms that potentially
have a greater modeling accuracy than theoretical mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
Policy Design and Game Theoretic
Framework
In this chapter, we delve deeper into the application of behavioral biases in policy design.
To analyze the potential impact of various behavioral policies, we formally describe a game
theoretic framework and model suitable utility functions.
3.1 Policy Design
In this section, we propose policy recommendations that leverage four behavioral biases.
In particular, we suggest policies that incorporate the status quo bias, commitment de-
vices, social norms, and gamification. The policies are designed to encourage participation
in the peaksaver PLUS program, that is, authorizing the utility provider to set the air
conditioner’s temperature up to a couple of degrees higher during peak load hours, on at
most five days in a year.
We realize that practical implementation of policies may involve several complications.
For example, the peaksaver PLUS program requires the consumers to have thermostat
controllers installed. Therefore, any practical implementation of such a policy would involve
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ensuring that the consumers have the necessary equipment installed. To overcome such
impediments, one may, for instance, target the policy only towards occupants moving into
newly constructed buildings or apartments, where one can ensure that the homes come
pre-equipped with the thermostats. We acknowledge the fact that due to lack of field
knowledge, our policy propositions may need to undergo several modifications before they
are implementable. Therefore, our policy recommendations should be viewed more like a
high-level framework, as opposed to a rigid set of rules. With this in mind, we make the
following policy propositions for implementing each bias:
3.1.1 Status Quo Bias
The status-quo bias motivates the occupants to not make any changes to the existing
thermostat infrastructure since it is the default option. Thus, as a policy measure, we
propose automatic enrollment of new households into the peaksaver PLUS program, unless
the household actively decides to opt out. Both pre-installation and automatic enrollment
take advantage of the status-quo bias.
3.1.2 Commitment Devices and Social Norms
We recommend commitment devices be incorporated in our proposed policy measures, in
conjunction with the establishment of favorable social norms. As commitment devices, we
would encourage participants to publicly acknowledge their participation in the peaksaver
PLUS program. As a part of the policy, we propose that tangible avenues be introduced
that facilitate public visibility of such acknowledgments. The said avenues should be
designed to cultivate a feeling of pride and well-being that is associated with making
a good gesture towards the society and the environment. In particular, as a publicly
visible indicator of participation, we propose awarding each participating home with a
peaksaver PLUS Volunteer Badge. The badge would serve two distinct purposes. First, it
would make participation public, thereby enforcing commitment on behalf of the consumer.
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Secondly, it would also foster an environment that promotes the adoption of the program
as a social norm. Additionally, we also realize that the media plays a crucial role in
forming and molding public opinion. Therefore, recommend that the policy allows for
active initiatives for setting up public billboards and sending newsletters, that advertise
the growing participation in the neighborhood. Proceeding on similar lines, the policy
may also aim at developing and popularizing mobile and web applications, to harness the
power of online social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Other similar efforts
may include events such as holding a special reception for the participants to meet the
mayor of the city. Such events should further support the cause by feeding the social
urge to be a part of an elite group, and disseminating quantitative information about the
number of people participating in the program.
3.1.3 Gamification
In addition to the peaksaver PLUS Volunteer Badge, we recommend awarding a green
score to each household, that could be calculated based on their energy consumption
profile with respect to the peaksaver PLUS program. We intend the green score be revised
periodically, say at the end of each year, to reflect how the household performed over the
past year. This evaluative number implicitly implements a game scenario where one must
reduce their energy consumption to achieve better reward points (green score). To foster
competitiveness, we further recommend maintaining local leader boards of green scores.
3.2 Answering the Hows and Whys of Policy Making
Prior work on behavioral economics and non-cash incentives for behavior modification mo-
tivates the use of non-cash incentives in our proposed policy. However, most prior works
only provide qualitative guidelines rather than quantitative insights. Given that millions
of dollars are spent in making and implementing peak-reduction policies [24,30,31,47,50],
it is important that we take well-informed policy decisions.
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Design and implementation of any policy has several practical challenges. For example,
we need to know how effective a particular policy will be. This would allow us to make
smarter decisions which help in the design process. Also, we need to understand the target
population. Since everybody is different, there are no guarantees that we would be able
to come up with a one-size-fits-all policy for everybody. It is obvious that we should iden-
tify different subsections of our target population and tweak the policies so that they are
tailor-made for each subpopulation.
Thus, our approach is to take a fresh approach to policy design. Specifically, we advo-
cate the use of concrete data-driven analysis before moving to the implementation phase.
We proceed by building a game-theoretic model based on a large crowd-sourced survey that
provides us with agent preferences. Thus, we directly elicit the population’s preferences
and design a game-theoretic mechanism for policy selection. We believe that this approach
can be used by policy makers even beyond the limited scope studied in this thesis.
3.3 Game Theoretic Model
A game-theoretic model is used to fine-tune both the design and implementation of our
policy. We use a standard principal-agent game setting, where the principal represents
the electricity supplier, and the agent is the consumer. The principal introduces and
implements policies to reduce the peak demand on summer afternoons when the grid is
experiencing very high demand. Therefore, the principal is interested in maximizing par-
ticipation in the peaksaver PLUS program. To do so, we next model the policies proposed
in Section 3.1. Note that the number of agents who participate in the program (say λ)
goes beyond a threshold λ∗, the peak load reduction goal is met.
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3.3.1 Principal’s Goal and Problem Formulation
The principal wants to achieve the peak demand reduction target. This depends on the
number of people participating in the program, and their level of thermal discomfort due to
increased temperatures (if participants are too uncomfortable, they will leave the program).
Therefore, the principal’s goals are two-fold. First, it needs to decide which policy set
from the set I of all possible policies, i.e. the power set over all incentives, maximizes
electricity savings. 1 Second, it needs to identify sections of the population that would
participate, for a certain ∆T increase in thermostat temperatures (0 temperature increase
for non-participating agents). The net electricity savings would, therefore, be proportional
to λ∆T (the monetary savings are actually non-linearly increasing with ∆T , so linear
proportionality is a conservative assumption. A 2% increase in temperature has been
found to reduce demand by 37% [18].).
We now formulate a general case utility model of the principal. Let ξi ∈ {0, 1} be
a variable where ξi = 1 if the principal offers an incentive i ∈ I and ξi = 0 otherwise.
We additionally assume that when the principal offers some incentive i ∈ I, it incurs a
cost χi. An incentive policy is specified by a vector P
in = (ξ1, . . . , ξ|I|) indicating which
incentives are offered by the principal. The cost associated with a particular incentive
policy is cost(P in) =
∑
i∈I χiξi. A policy, P , is an incentive policy coupled with an expected
temperature increase, ∆T , the principal wishes to implement. That is, P = 〈P in,∆T 〉.
We assume that the principal implements a policy only if a minimum threshold partic-
ipation of λ∗ is met. The threshold λ∗ signifies a lower bound on the acceptable electricity
savings determined according to the peak demand reduction requirement. Given a policy,
P , let λ(P ) be the number of agents willing to participate in the program given the policy.
Mathematically, λ(P ) is given by:
λ(P ) = |{j|Πj(P ) ≥ 0}|.
where Πj(P ) represents agent j’s utility under policy P . For simplicity, we assume that
the agent’s utility from different incentives is additive, so that for calculating Πj(P ) we
1A particular policy set is identified and implemented at the beginning, i.e., the principal gets only one
chance at selecting and implementing a policy in the game.
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add the utility from only those incentives that are included in the policy P . We discuss
this in further detail in 3.3.2.




cost(λ(P )∆T )−∑i∈I χiξi
s.t. λ(P ) ≥ λ∗
(3.1)
where cost(λ∆T ) denotes the monetary value of the electricity savings. Here, a uniform
∆T temperature increase is used for agents whose utility stays non-negative after account-
ing for discomfort due to the increase, and a zero temperature increase for all agents whose
utility becomes negative upon imposing a ∆T increase in thermostat temperature.
3.3.2 Agent Model
Let there be n agents in the system. Each agent i has a private type θi that determines its
utility for different aspects of the policy, and let the type space be given by Θ. For agent i,
let Si, Ci, Ni and Gi denote the utility due to status quo bias, commitment devices, social
norms, and gamification respectively; let di(∆T ) represent the absolute utility value of its
thermal discomfort under a ∆T increase signal from the principal; and let Πi(P ) be the
net utility derived by the agent from the biases and the discomfort under policy P .
Let A = {0, 1} denote the action set, where 1 and 0 denote if the agent chooses to
participate or not participate, respectively. Let ai ∈ A denote the action taken by agent i.
We assume that agents are individually rational and thus will participate only when their
utility from participating is greater than or equal to zero.
Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn), C = (C1, . . . , Cn),N = (N1, . . . , Nn), G = (G1, . . . , Gn), D(∆T ) =
(d1(∆T ), . . . , dn(∆T )), and Z = (a1, . . . , an), ∀ai ∈ A, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} where Z repre-
sents the action profile.
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Then we define the following function mappings
A : S × C ×N × G ×D → Z
where A maps from the agents’ utility distributions to the action profile. The action
profile is also the outcome of the game, as it represents the agents’ participation distribu-
tion.
We now consider modeling Πi, the net utility derived by an agent i. In [37], Keeney
demonstrates how assessing a multiattribute utility function is more of an art than science;
and coincidentally, deals with formulating a utility function for an energy policy. Many
prominent psychologists and economists like Meehl, Kahneman, Dawes et al. in their
respective works [25, 34, 46], have argued, firstly, in favor of using precise mathematical
algorithms instead of intuition arising from expertise, and secondly, how even a simple
and naive model works efficiently as a composite predictor. Therefore, for evaluating the
net utility obtained from combining utility from different biases, we use an additive linear
utility model 2. At this point, we still need to model the weights that appropriately scale
the utilities so that they can be combined linearly.
Mathematically, we calculate the net utility for agent i as follows:
Πi(P ) = ξSw
S
i Si + ξCw
C
i Ci + ξNw
N
i Ni + ξNw
N
i Ni − di(∆T )
where wji represents agent i’s weight for bias j ∈ {S,C,N,G}, and (ξS, ξC , ξN , ξG) is P in.
For succinctness in presentation, we represent Πi(P ) as follows:
Πi(P ) = (P
in ◦ (wSi , wCi , wGi , wNi ))(Si, Ci, Ni, Gi)ᵀ − di(∆T )
2We assume that the net utility Π depends only on the marginal distributions of the utility S, C, N , and
G,derived from the biases, and not on their joint distributions [28]. Again, due to the mutual independence
of utilities from different biases, without loss of generality, our utility model can also be assumed to be
linear.
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where ◦ denotes the entry-wise product or Hadamard product operation.
It is noteworthy that even though participants of the peaksaver PLUS program receive
monetary benefits due to reduced consumption, it is inappropriate to include it in the
policy and the utility functions, as it may counter-act the utility received from behavioral
policies. This is because framing is important part of behavioral policy design, and there
is evidence that bringing money into the picture may change people’s mindset [43].
3.3.3 Agent Participation Criteria
For an agent to participate in the programs of our policy, the utility of the agent un-
der participation should be greater than or equal to the utility of the agent under non-
participation. Consider an agent who is willing to participate if the maximum temperature
by which the thermostat is allowed to increase is ∆Tmax. Clearly, the agent’s utility is 0
at ∆Tmax. If the temperature increase is less than ∆Tmax, the utility for the agent under
participation is always non-negative. Hence, it is axiomatically a dominant strategy for the
agent to participate. We have three core assumptions that allow us to make this argument.
These are, for all agents:
• If the utility derived is zero, the agent’s action is to conform with the policy. That is,
agents prefer weakly dominant strategies that lead to a desirable outcome, to those
that lead to undesirable outcomes (from the point of view of the principal).
• Utility derived from non-cash incentives is non-negative
• Utility derived from non-cash incentives under non-participation is zero.
3.4 Measuring Utility of the Agent
Much of the agent’s utility model that we presented in the previous section depends on
the type of the agent. We shall discuss more about agent types and how we determine
them in the following chapters. However, for calculating discomfort, we use a modification
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of Fanger’s Predicted Mean Vote (PMV) model [27]. Being able to evaluate the value of
D(∆T ), would enable us to calculate the net negative utility that the principal needs to
offset using incentives, to be able to meet its target energy saving goal.
3.4.1 Utility from Thermal Discomfort
We use Fanger’s equations for computing the PMV of a human occupant in the house.
According to Fanger’s equations, the PMV depends on several factors like air tempera-
ture, mean radiant temperature, air speed, humidity, metabolic rate of the person, and
their clothing level. Since we need to measure the comfort levels of humans in closed
houses that are equipped with thermostats, we make certain reasonable assumptions that
would be very likely to hold in practice. We assume the humidity level to be at 50%, the
mean radiant temperature to be equal to the air temperature, the airspeed to be zero, a
metabolic rate of 1.2met, and clothing level to be 0.5clo that represents typical summer
indoor clothing. Using these values, we find the varying levels of discomfort experienced
by a person.
The Fanger’s equations take six different parameters as input and render the PMV as
output. This makes analysis of the equation difficult. Since in our case, we deal with only
a particular set of values of these parameters, we find the PMV values obtained for a range
of temperatures with these parameters, and fit a simple linear equation to the PMV values
using regression. For the purpose of regression, we obtain the data points from [4]. We
find that the PMV values can be accurately represented by the following equation, with a
Mean Square error of 0.02%.
PMV (t) = (0.306)|t− 24.6| − 0.48
where t represents temperature in Celsius. Now, according to ASHRAE’s Standard 55,
humans feel comfortable in the PMV range of [−0.5, 0.5]. Therefore, we may calculate the
absolute value of the utility derived from discomfort by the following equation.
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d(|t− 24.6|) =
0 if |t− 24.6| ≤ 1.6PMV (t) if |t− 24.6| > 1.6
In the above definitions of discomfort and PMV, it is assumed that the average human is
comfortable at 24.6 degrees Celsius. In our model, we assume that the agent is comfortable
at the temperature t∗ of the household (set by the agent), whatever that temperature is. So,
for calculation of both discomfort and PMV, we replace 24.6 by t∗. With this modification,
we define discomfort of agent i as follows:
di(|Tset − t∗|) =
0 if |Tset − t∗| ≤ 1.6PMV (Tset) if |Tset − t∗| > 1.6
where Tset represents the higher temperature set by the mechanism administrator during
peak load hours. Now, |Tset− t∗| is equal to the ∆T increase in the thermostat, as signaled
by the principal. Therefore, substituting ∆T for |Tset−t∗|, we obtain the following equation
for discomfort:
di(∆T ) =
0 if ∆T ≤ 1.6(0.306)(∆T )− 0.48 if ∆T > 1.6
3.4.2 Utility from Biases
For measuring utility from biases, we first determine the underlying agent types. To that
end, we conduct a survey that elicits behavioral preferences. We will discuss more about
the design, execution, and interpretation of the survey in the coming chapters.
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Chapter 4
Survey for Agent Types
As discussed earlier, the general area of behavioral economics is making its presence felt
in several disciplines. However, the majority of the research contributions to this field
are from psychologists and behavioral economists. Contributions are mostly derived from
meticulously crafted experimental routines that can be rigid in their design. The condi-
tions for these experiments are tightly controlled. This makes it difficult to adapt these
techniques for other purposes. For example, the Self-control scale [60] measures a person’s
ability to resist temptations, but it is hard to generalize scores on this scale to derive infor-
mation about how much the person values commitment devices in the context of thermal
comfort. Given the potential gain from behavioral economics in areas of research, it would
be useful to derive guidelines that enable researchers from other areas to conduct similar
behavioral studies.
One way to conduct a behavioral study is by using a psychometric survey. The primary
aim of the survey questionnaire is to objectively quantify aspects of human behavior. We
specifically choose surveys to be our preferred means of collecting data, as it is cheaper
than conducting elaborate experiments. Surveys are also easy to conduct using online
platforms. In this chapter, we present guidelines and procedures we followed in conducting
a survey for eliciting preferences towards cognitive biases in energy policies, which may
prove beneficial for researchers. We also provide details about the design elements and
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structure of our survey.
4.1 Designing and Conducting a Behavioral Survey
Compared to other means of data collection, surveys are inexpensive, highly scalable,
and help obtain responses from a potentially diverse set of audiences. These advantages
are further enhanced by online platforms for creating and conducting surveys. However,
designing a psychometric survey has some subtle issues. For example, to prevent bias
in survey responses, individuals from the target population should interpret the questions
objectively. Such subtleties may demand several iterations before the questionnaire is ready
to be deployed. In this section, we will discuss our survey design and execution processes
in detail.
4.1.1 Survey Structure
A well-thought-out survey structure is essential for ensuring data quality. For example,
all questions pertaining to a particular behavioral phenomena should be grouped together,
thereby forming clearly demarcated sections. This prevents confusion, makes the survey
more readable, and also helps in organization and analysis of responses.
4.1.2 Framing Questions
Recall that the primary aim of the survey questionnaire is to objectively quantify aspects
of human behavior. As human behavior is intrinsically qualitative in nature, several pre-
cautions should be taken while framing questions. We recommend the following rules of
thumb and best practices [12,13,32]:
1. Questions should articulate precise and objective situations or provide concrete exam-
ples. This reduces errors arising out of subjective interpretation by the respondents.
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An example of a question to avoid is: How often do you fulfill your commitments?
An example of a better question is: Suppose you and your friend agree to go to the
gym together, a few times a week. How likely are you to do so?
2. It is a good practice to ask a number of specific questions that all aim to gauge the
same behavioral aspect. For example, in place of a single general question like, How
often do you fulfill your commitments?, it is better to ask a set of specific questions
like the following:
• Suppose you and your friend agree to go to the gym together, a few times a week.
How likely are you to?
• Suppose you promised yourself that you would read more books. How likely are
you to follow through?
• Suppose you are on a diet. How likely are you to successfully resist that extra
piece of cake?
3. Questions should not cite multiple examples. Doing so may introduce biases and
potential anomalies in the responses due to possible miscommunication or misinter-
pretation. For example, the question, How often do you fulfill your commitments like
going to the gym with a friend, or sticking to a diet?, is undesirable because it cites
multiple examples. Instead, it is better to use a question with a single example, such
as, How often do you fulfill your commitment to go the gym?
4. Questions should not be complicated. An example of a poorly constructed question
is Your recently inherited money is in a moderate risk mutual fund. Assuming that
you want to keep the money invested somewhere, and you have other real-world op-
tions like directly investing in stocks, purchasing treasury bills or bonds, investing in
another mutual fund, investing as a venture capitalist, etc. How likely are you to
cash out the money and invest it somewhere else. An example of a better question
is, Your recently inherited money is in a moderate risk investment. Assuming that
you wish to keep the money invested, how likely is it that you would change how the
money is invested
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5. Clarify wording for obtaining unbiased or incorrect responses. For example, consider
the following questions:
• How much higher are you willing to adjust your thermostat than your usual, if
you are provided incentive A?
• How much higher are you willing to adjust your thermostat than your usual, if
we are provided incentive B?
• How much higher are you willing to adjust your thermostat than your usual, if
we are provided both incentive A and B?
In this case, suppose it is implicitly assumed that incentives A and B together have a
greater impact than either of them alone. Then, to avoid incorrect responses to the
third question, it is better to explicitly clarify by adding a statement – The answer to
the third question should either be the maximum value of the answers to the previous
two questions, or more than that.
6. Group related questions together under separate pages for good structure, and ran-
domize question order within each page to remove unforeseen biases.
7. Having a dual sample, i.e. collecting data from different samples of the population,
helps in comparison and further validation of results. Alternatively, this can be
enforced by making splits in the data set, and cross-validating the results.
8. Consistently use a single scale throughout the survey. Using different scales within
the same survey might be confusing for participants, and may introduce anomalies
in their responses. The five-point Likert Scale [44] is a good choice for psychometric
surveys.
9. Avoid leading questions, i.e. questions that are suggestive in nature and may influ-
ence the participant’s response. A common sanity-check is to take a step back and
observe if the question could be interpreted in a different way by people from different
backgrounds. This can also be caught in a pilot survey. An example of a leading
question – Do you think your electricity rates are high? This question suggests that
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electricity prices are high. A more neutral question would be – Do you think your
electricity rates are appropriate?
10. Multiple-choice questions eliciting factual information should present all possible
choices. In such cases, adding a Cannot answer option or providing an additional
text field for explanation are both good practices.
For example, consider the question On an average, how much is your monthly elec-
tricity bill? Let us assume this question has two answer choices – $25 or less, and
more than $25. However, it should be noted that the options are not exhaustive.
What if the participant does not have this information? Not having the right option
may drive the participant to choose an answer that may not be accurate. In such
cases, it is a good practice to include an additional Cannot answer option.
11. To ensure good quality of responses, it is often wise to include trap questions and
attention checks like, To what extent do you agree with the statement Five dollars plus
fifteen dollars is equal to three dollars. Similarly, recording response time to judge
quality can also help, i.e., if a question is answered too quickly, it may be incorrectly
answered. We also recommend IP-filtering to remove duplicate answers, since two
answers from the same IP address are very likely to be from the same person.
12. If certain questions elicit sensitive information, it is often a good idea to load the
question. Loading refers to creating a comfortable circumstance and building a cer-
tain level of trust, so that the respondent feels comfortable to provide the real answer
and not just a socially desirable answer. For example, a participant may feel uncom-
fortable answering to – Have you ever made an inappropriate comment in a social
situation that you found was embarrassing? A better way to frame such a question
would be by making the participant feel comfortable about disclosing the information
– It has been observed that most people have had several experiences of embarrass-
ing themselves in public. Have you ever made an inappropriate comment in a social
situation that you found was embarrassing?
13. Add a question towards the end of the survey that asks the respondent if they feel
they had appropriately answered all the questions. Here, it is also imperative to
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state that they will not be denied payment if they chose that they did not answer
questions adequately.
14. Add a seriousness check by stating that good research findings depend on good quality
data. For example, one could add a disclaimer at the beginning of the survey that
states, Only datasets from participants with a motivation for serious participation
will be analyzed. Using University or research organization credibility also urges
respondents to answer questions seriously.
15. Research findings suggest that survey respondents’ focus level is higher in the begin-
ning and lower towards the end of the survey [20]. Therefore, placing more cognitively
demanding questions early on is a good idea. That said, placing harder questions
first, may decrease survey participation since most dropouts take place during initial
parts of the survey.
16. Place sensitive questions towards the end of the survey. The respondent can be
assumed to have developed a certain level of comfort with the questions towards the
end of the survey, and is, therefore, more likely to answer them without inhibitions.
17. It may be beneficial to mention how much time the survey would take to complete.
In fact, inflating this figure by say 3-4 minutes is also a good idea. This sets the
expectations correctly, builds trust, and weeds out non-serious respondents. Also,
conduct an objective assessment of the estimated time (using a pilot survey, for
example), instead of quoting an approximate length of time that’s purely based on
judgment.
18. While designing the questions, it is always a good idea to have your peers or colleagues
review them. Seeking opinions about confusing questions, ambiguous wording, etc.,
helps in improving the quality of responses.
19. When the survey questionnaire is ready, we recommend conducting a pilot survey
before the actual survey. One way of obtaining feedback on a pilot survey is to have
an additional option that respondents can click for each question, if they feel the
question is not clear to them.
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20. Before collecting responses, it is vital to sketch an outline of the steps involved in the
interpretation and analysis of the survey. This helps in avoiding potential unforeseen
circumstances and ensures that the survey questionnaire meets the needs of the study.
A mock analysis of responses from the pilot survey often helps. For example, one
may miss out on including a question on a particular topic, and realize that they need
the information only after all the survey responses are in. Conducting a preliminary
analysis helps in such cases.
21. As a part of the survey’s post processing, it is better to drop flat-liners – responses
with very low variance in their answers.
22. Opt-in panels, i.e. panels where the respondents willingly choose to participate in the
survey, should not report sampling error. There is no theoretical basis for calculating
sampling error since participation is not random.
23. Demographic information, if required, should be sought at the end of the survey.
Some examples of basic demographic information that can be sought are age, gender,
ethnicity, and educational qualification.
4.1.3 Research Ethics
It is the responsibility of the designer of the survey to abide by ethics regulations set by a
government body or the concerned organization that the designer represents. For example,
when collecting data, appropriate means must be adopted to maintain data anonymity,
confidentiality, and privacy. Some organizations may impose approval prerequisites from
an Ethics body, before conducting the study. Additionally, participants should receive a
fair remuneration for their time.
Our survey had been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, a University of
Waterloo Research Ethics Committee, before we conducted the survey. More information
about University of Waterloo’s research ethics policies can be found at [8, 9].
30
4.1.4 Conducting the Survey
There are several different ways to execute a survey and collect responses. The avenues
depend on available funds and goals.
Completely outsourcing the survey to third-party panel firms is an option, but may
be quite expensive. In this case, the third party would be responsible for recruiting par-
ticipants, seeking responses, drafting the results, and even analyzing the results. The
recruitment process could be carried out either in person, via telephone calls, or via emails
and other electronic media.
Another approach would be to procure a dataset containing the concerned localities’
consumer information such as name, address, telephone number, etc. Several websites pro-
vide business to business (B2B) and business to consumer (B2C) datasets for a price [5].
These datasets may only have the name, address and telephone numbers of the consumers.
Small businesses pay and acquire such datasets for targeted marketing. With such datasets,
one would need to call people from the list, and invite them to participate in the survey.
This makes the process very cumbersome to execute. A natural alternative is to procure
email-ids and request participation via emails. However, it is worth noting that Canadian
anti-spam laws in effect since July 1, 2014, prevent the sale of datasets that contain email-
ids [1, 2]. In fact, this law applies to any commercial electronic communication, including
email, SMS, social media or instant messaging. More specifically, the law also prevents
electronic communication for persuasion to participate in surveys. For these reasons, direct
communication may not be the best way to recruit participants.
Online surveys can be conducted using websites like SurveyMonkey or Qualtrics. These
websites provide simple and streamlined platforms for hosting surveys, collecting responses,
and organizing the collected data. Such websites also provide additional facilities like online
survey panels, but these are expensive. An economical alternative is to use crowdsourcing
platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower to recruit participants. One major
criticism about the use of crowdsourcing platforms is that the sample of participants, having
gone through an opt-in process, cannot be regarded as a statistically randomized sample
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of the population. Nevertheless, they are an economical and attractive option.
In our case, we hosted our survey using SurveyMonkey and obtained responses through
CrowdFlower. We opted for these platforms because of their ease of use, scalability, and
cost-effectiveness. Our target audience consisted of people living in the United States and
Canada. A map showing locations of survey respondents can be seen in Figure 4.1.
4.1.5 Executing Jobs on CrowdFlower
Creating and executing jobs on CrowdFlower is user-friendly for the most part. One can
design and launch jobs fairly easily, and monitor the progress of jobs on its dashboard.
The only part of executing a job on CrowdFlower that may be challenging, is to make sure
that the remuneration is paid fairly, and without any security loopholes, as provisioning
of remuneration codes is not handled by CrowdFlower. When contributors accepted our
job on CrowdFlower, they were linked to our survey on SurveyMonkey. Upon comple-
tion of the survey, we asked the contributor to access a webpage hosted our server (bliz-
zard.cs.uwaterloo.ca), where they obtained a remuneration code for CrowdFlower. Crowd-
Flower provides a client-side interface in the form of a text-box portal, for writing custom
JavaScript. We used this interface to configure remuneration codes. To generate unique
valid codes for every contributor, we maintained a database of codes on our server. For
every new contributor trying to use a remuneration code, the custom JavaScript queried
our server and verified the validity of the code. In the database on our server, we also
maintained the contributor’s IP address, and a flag variable to check if the code had been
used before. These steps ensured that the code worked for every contributor, and that the
code worked exactly once. The JavaScript code can be found in Appendix C.
4.1.6 Statistical Know-How
For appropriate design and interpretation of the survey, it is important to have knowledge
of basic statistical concepts like experiment design, statistical sampling, hypothesis testing
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Figure 4.1: Map showing locations of survey participants
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and confidence intervals, etc. If lacking an adequate knowledge of statistics, we strongly
recommend consulting a statistician before conducting the survey.
For our survey, we used the services of Statistical Consulting Service at the University
of Waterloo, wherein they reviewed and validated that our survey.
4.1.7 Appropriate Sample Size for Survey
The population of the United States and Canada is roughly 332.5 million [3,10]. Given this
population size, if we had a truely random sample, we would have aimed to have a sample
size of 385, to have the worst case confidence interval (error bars) of 5% for any observed
distribution of responses to a question, at 95% level of significance [11]. However, since our
sample is not truly statistically randomized, the numbers we provide here should only be
considered as indicative of the inferences we may be able to derive from a well-randomized
sample.
We obtained a total of 990 responses to our survey, and after data-cleaning were left
with 425 responses. Our inferences are based on these 425 responses. We will discuss more
about survey responses in the next chapter.
4.1.8 Major Components of Our Survey
Our entire survey can be found in Appendix A. The purpose of our survey is to extract
preferences about the four biases (status quo bias, social norms, commitment bias, and
gamification), temperature sensitivity and thermostat behavior, and the impact of the
biases on the thermostat settings. We have eight major sections within the survey that
measure these attributes. Within the survey, each of these sections start on a new page.
The first section has qualifier questions. Based on responses to these questions, we
decide if the response belongs to our target population.
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The next four sections of the survey elicit preferences regarding commitment devices,
status quo bias, social norms, and gamification respectively. These questions aim at finding
the degree to which respondents might be predisposed to the biases in general, rather than
specific circumstances.
The sixth section inquires about house occupancy during peak load hours in the sum-
mer. We broadly target the two scenarios where people’s houses may systematically and
predictably be unoccupied during the peak load hours. The two scenarios being: either the
occupants are out on a vacation for a long stretch of time, or the occupants are consistently
away from home during the said hours due to external commitments such as work. We
hypothesize that this information may be suggestive of the ‘unreliability’ of a particular
household during the summer season. By unreliability, we mean that the household may
be unoccupied and hence we may or may not be able to change the temperature for these
households depending on whether the thermostat is left working or switched off 1.
The seventh section asks the respondents about their usual thermostat settings during
peak load times in summer, and to what extent the occupants are sensitive to temperature
2.
The eighth and final section inquires about the extent (in terms of temperature in degree
Celsius) by which the respondents would be willing to set their temperature higher. In
particular, we seek this information under two cases. First, while considering the incentive
from each bias individually, and second, while considering the net incentive when all the
biases are implemented. These responses enable us to find the proportion of contribution
of each of the biases towards their net utility. We will discuss about utility from the biases
in further detail in Chapter 5.
1To avoid uncertainty, we later decided to exclude information from our model
2As a part of modeling choice, we later decided not to use this information. Instead, we made a
modeling assumption, according to which we only needed the change in thermostat temperature and not
the absolute value of the temperature; as discussed in section 5.4.3.
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4.1.9 Scoring
For all the questions in the survey that measure utility from the biases or the discom-
fort, we use a five-point Likert scale [44]. For evaluating scores obtained from the survey
responses, we use an adjusted scale with unequal distances between the Likert items, as
opposed to a uniformly linear scale [39]. In particular, we use unequal distances with the
scoring set {0, 0.2, 2, 3.8, 4}, to overcome the middle-of-scale effect, which states that
using verbal anchors at all points on the Likert scale creates “a larger perceived distance
between points in the middle of the scale” [39]. 3
4.2 Survey Takers’ Happiness
To the best of our ability, we ensured that the respondents were happy with the survey tak-
ing experience. To this end, we offered competitive remuneration for the task, and prompt
email support for any respondents having trouble with receiving their remuneration.
4.2.1 Deciding Participant Remuneration
We decided to award a remuneration of one United States Dollar (USD) per participant,
based on data samples collected from Amazon Mturk.
• For a sample of 11 “research” surveys, a plot of Frequency v/s Price in USD is shown
in Figure 4.2.
• For a sample of 52 surveys of all kinds, a plot of Frequency v/s Price in USD is shown
in Figure 4.3.
For both considered samples, we observed the following additional criteria:
3It should be noted that during our initial exploratory analysis of the survey data, we use a linear
Likert scale, to get a clear understanding of the nature of the data. Later, during our final analysis, we
use the curved Likert scale for scoring.
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Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of how much research surveys pay on Amazon MTurk
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Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of how much surveys, in general, pay on Amazon MTurk
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Figure 4.4: Contributors’ feedback rating on CrowdFlower
• Minimum cutoff payment was $0.5
• Only respondents who had completed at least 1000 tasks were considered. This is a
standard qualifier for contributors on Amazon MTurk.
• All tasks considered were less than 30 minutes long.
4.2.2 Respondents’ Feedback Rating
From among the 990 participants of the survey task, 74 participants rated our survey task
on clarity of instructions, fairness of test questions, ease of job, and remuneration. A
screenshot of the average ratings from these 74 participants can be seen in Figure 4.4.
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Chapter 5
Survey Interpretation, Data Analysis
and Results
In this chapter, we analyze and interpret the data from our survey. In particular, we
seek to identify agent types based on their preferences. We also use data from the survey
to calculate our model’s parameters, and to calibrate weights for combining utility from
the biases and discomfort. Ultimately, we solve the principal’s optimization problem of
maximizing energy savings under uniform and non-uniform signals sent to the agents.
5.1 Data Cleaning
Conducting a survey on a crowd sourced platform like CrowdFlower has its trade-offs.
To our advantage, it allows us to conduct our survey in a large geographical region and
quickly obtain numerous responses. However, to our disadvantage, several factors lead to
anomalous dirty responses in our survey data. We discuss these next.
• Remuneration provided on crowd sourcing platforms is generally low. We pay one
US dollar for completing our survey. While this remuneration is competitive, and in
fact, better than the average, workers are still underpaid compared to a real world
job. Therefore, it is expected that some workers may not answer the survey seriously.
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• Moreover, due to restrictions enforced by Research Ethics, we allow the respondent
to not answer questions and skip to the end of the survey.
Since we cannot rely on the quality of data we obtain, we employ a set of data cleaning
rules to eliminate untrustworthy responses, before data analysis. We carry out the following
steps for data cleaning. The number of responses removed in each step, from a total of 990
responses, is shown in parenthesis.
1. Removed responses from surveys that were quit midway (9 responses removed).
2. Removed responses that were completed but had at least one question blank (101
responses removed).
3. Removed any duplicate responses from the same IP address (65 responses removed).
4. Removed responses from surveys that asserted that they do not have thermostats
(44 responses removed).
5. Removed responses from surveys that asserted that they do not have air conditioners
(89 responses removed).
6. Removed responses that failed to answer the trap questions correctly. Responses
that answered the trap questions with the middle option on the Likert scale were
considered to have failed. For example, a response of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ to
the question “Is five dollars plus fifteen dollars equal to three dollars?” would be
disqualified.
One of the questions asked if the hottest day of summer is expected to be colder than
the coldest day of winter. The other question asserted the converse of this question.
Because of the confusing nature of these questions, we deleted only those responses
that had failed to answer both these questions correctly (149 responses removed).
7. Removed responses that did not answer questions 35 and 36 as requested (98 re-
sponses removed).
41
8. Removed flat–liners, that is, responses with very low variance (< 1.0) across all
questions seeking responses on the linear Likert scale (6 responses removed).
9. Those responses that said in Q38 that they did not answer attentively and would not
want us to use their data (4 responses removed).
After the data cleaning process, we were left with 425 responses – we believe a sufficient
sample for drawing inferences.
5.2 Pilot Survey Statistics
We ran a pilot survey on 114 respondents before we conducting the full version of the
survey. The primary aims of the pilot survey were to check for anomalies in interpretation
of the questionnaire, and to obtain preliminary insight into the results of the survey. We
applied the data cleaning process, as explained in the previous section, and looked for
anomalies in the data. We observed the following from the pilot survey:
• About 30% of respondents had answered Q36 incorrectly. The question inquires
about the net temperature by which the respondent is willing to set their thermostat
higher, given all four incentives from Q35 are implemented. Since we assume that the
utility from the biases are non-negative and additive, the answer to Q36 should be
at least the maximum value reported in Q35. This essentially rendered these 30% of
responses unusable according to our data cleaning standards. This lead us to change
the language of Q36 and explicitly state our requirements in the question.
In particular, we replaced the statements “To what extent would you be willing to
volunteer? (Hint: Should not be less than the maximum value you chose in Q35, since
all programs are implemented at once),” with “For this question, your answer should
either be the maximum value of the four responses you gave in the last question, or
more than that. Keeping that in mind, in total, how much higher are you willing to
adjust your thermostat than your usual (during summer afternoons)?”
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With this modification, we did not observe this data anomaly in our final survey
version.
• After applying the data cleaning process, we obtained about 64% of usable responses.
5.3 Exploring the Data
In this section, we conduct detailed exploratory analysis on the data that we obtained from
the full survey, after cleaning.
5.3.1 Full Survey Data Statistics - a Preview
We first explore the nature of the data through some basic plots. Here, we use values on the
linear Likert scale {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, where 0 corresponds to the least bias, and 4 represents the
highest bias on the scale. Figure 5.1a shows the distribution of responses (on Likert scale)
across the population for every question that elicits generic preferences towards biases.
Note that this plot may not reveal much information about agent types, though. Agent
types would depend on collective analysis across individual responses and not individual
questions. It merely gives us some insight into how effective a bias is in general.
Figure 5.1b shows the mean and standard deviations of responses of each question
across the population. Computed values are based on the linear Likert scale of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Since the response distributions are unimodal and show central tendency, a high mean and
low standard deviation indicates that the bias may have strong influence on people, in
general. A low mean and high standard deviation, as seen for some questions pertaining
to gamification and social norms, shows that the bias in question may not have a strong




Figure 5.1: Statistics of responses for every question eliciting non-cash incentive preferences
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5.3.2 Preliminary Screening for Clusters
The purpose of clustering is to identify a small number of agent types. Identifying agent
types from the data is inherently hard because of its dimensionality. If we had only one
question for each bias, it would be easy to identify types. Based on the Likert scores of
the response, we could classify them into a discrete number of types. However, we cannot
draw inferences based on one question per bias, as this would introduce unpredictability
into our psychometric scale. Now, given the fact that we have multiple questions eliciting
information about the same bias, a particular response could have inconsistent Likert scores
on these questions. Indeed, we have such observations in our data. This poses challenges
for identification of agent types. However, the presence of clusters in the data would be
a sufficient condition for asserting that those clusters correspond to the underlying agent
types. This motivates us to perform cluster analysis on the data.
We performed a centroid-based k-means cluster analysis on the raw data from the
survey that included unprocessed data from questions eliciting bias information. However,
the raw data did not yield any clusters. So, we conducted Exploratory Factor Analysis
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the raw data, and reran the cluster analysis
on the factors and principal components respectively 1. We still did not observe clusters.
5.3.3 Cluster Analysis Revisited
As a means of reducing the dimensionality, we use the aggregate score (section 5.4.2) for
each bias, thereby reducing the data representing the four biases to a four dimensional
space. We analyze this data for centroid-based k-means clusters. We observe standard
analysis practices like calculating the within-group-sum-of-squares (WGSS) [38] and Calin-
ski Harabasz index (ch-index) [22], to determine the ideal number of clusters in the dataset.
Our results still do not indicate the presence of any prominently distinguishable clusters.
Therefore, we do not have a reasonably small number of discrete agent types. Figure 5.2
and Figure 5.3 show the plots of WGSS and ch-index for commitment bias, respectively.
1Although, as a side note, we did not particularly prefer conducting factor analysis or PCA, as this
would result in loss of original variables during the analysis.
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The WGSS plot does not have a “knee” and the ch-index plot does not have clear “peak”.
Results for other biases are similar.
5.4 Data Interpretation and Analysis Procedures
In this section we discuss how we utilized data from the survey to directly calibrate our
game theoretic model. With the calibrated model in place, we deduce inferences about
optimality of policy sets, possible actions for the principal, and their corresponding out-
comes.
5.4.1 Post hoc Survey Questionnaire Cleaning
Due to the lack of clusters in the data set, we decided to post hoc remove some questions
from the survey. These are questions whose answers are inconsistent with other answers
relating to the same bias. Arguably, these are due to confusion on the part of the survey
respondents. For selecting the questions from the questionnaire that best represent the un-
derlying psychological bias, we carry out an optimization process based on the correlation
matrix obtained for questions relating to each bias. This selection process is based on the
assumption that all questions that elicit a general measure of predisposition of a person
towards a particular bias, should have well-correlated responses. If the data from a partic-
ular question is not well-correlated, we argue that this question is not representative of the
concerned bias and should not be part of the survey. Since we could not have predicted
which questions are best suited for eliciting preferences of this nature before conducting
the survey, we employ this post hoc selection process.
The correlation matrix provides the pairwise correlation of responses to questions for
each bias (see Figures 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7). To find the best correlated subset of questions, we
enumerate all possible question combinations and use a normalized measure of correlation
for each subset – we call this Within-Group Average Correlation (WGAC). We calculate
WGAC on a set of random variables as the sum of their pairwise correlations, divided by
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Figure 5.2: Within Group Sum of Squares vs. Number of Clusters for commitment bias
47
















Figure 5.3: ch-Index vs. Number of Clusters for commitment bias
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the total number of pairs. Mathematically, WGAC is calculated as follows:
WGAC(V) =
∑
X,Y ∈V,X 6=Y corr(X, Y )(|V|
2
)
where V is the set of random variables for which we are computing WGAC, and corr(X, Y )
is the correlation between random variables X and Y . This measure is good for compar-
ison across different subsets of questions, as it provides (averaged) comparable values of
dependence among questions in that subset. Further, we multiply a reward factor with the
normalized correlation measure, and maximize this value across all possible subsets. We
define the reward factor as the number of questions present in the subset being considered.
This reward factor penalizes smaller subsets and rewards bigger subsets, thus helping min-
imize the number of questions that we eliminate.
The (arbitrary) choice of the reward function has an impact on the number of questions
in our optimal subset. Considering this flexibility in the reward function, we face the choice
of choosing responses from three or four questions per bias. Choosing three questions per
bias gives a stronger pairwise correlation, while choosing four question per bias retains more
information from the survey. Also, it is worth noting that for all four biases, we find that
the best 4-member subset contains the optimal 3-member subset. These sets are questions
{Q8, Q9, Q10} (0.41 WGAC) and {Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10} (0.36 WGAC) respectively for com-
mitment bias, questions {Q13, Q14, Q15} (0.19 WGAC) and {Q13, Q14, Q15, Q17} (0.14
WGAC) respectively for status quo bias, questions {Q18, Q19, Q21} (0.22 WGAC) and
{Q18, Q19, Q21, Q22} (0.17 WGAC) respectively for social norms, and questions {Q23, Q24, Q25}
(0.43 WGAC) and {Q23, Q24, Q25, Q27} (0.34 WGAC) respectively for gamification. In
the end, we decided to keep as many questions as possible, and we opt for 4-member sub-
sets of questions for each bias. For further details on the correlation matrices, please refer
to Figures 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7.
Having selected the questions from the survey that we would want to consider, we now
focus on identifying agent types.
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Figure 5.4: Correlation matrix showing pairwise correlation of responses for Commitment
bias
Figure 5.5: Correlation matrix showing pairwise correlation of responses for Status quo
bias
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Figure 5.6: Correlation matrices showing pairwise correlation of responses for Social Norms
Figure 5.7: Correlation matrices showing pairwise correlation of responses for Gamification
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5.4.2 Aggregate Score and Data Agreement
For better reliability of our psychometric scale, we have multiple questions for each bias.
However, a survey participant may not have answered all the questions for a bias with
similar and coherent Likert scores. For example, consider two responses on a linear Likert
scale {0,1,2,3,4}: one that has all ‘4’s on the Likert scale, and another that has two ‘4’s, a
‘2’, and a ‘1’ on the Likert scale. We need to be able to assign a score to each response,
for each bias, so that we have a metric for comparing across different survey responses.
We have four questions for measuring each bias. Specifically, for each survey response,
we calculate an aggregate score for each bias, as the sum of Likert scores for that bias. We
set the values of the utility parameters S, C, N , and G to their respective aggregate scores.
The notion of aggregate score achieves two purposes. Firstly, it reduces dimensionality of
observations from the four-dimensional space to the one-dimensional space. Secondly,
it incorporates a concept of agreement, that refers to how close or distant a particular
response is to the ideal response, thereby giving us a comparison metric across responses
(separately for each bias). Since we measure the degree of inclination towards various
biases, our ideal response, in this case, is a response that has ‘4’s on the Likert scale
for all questions, thus representing the highest bias score. We measure the distance (L1-
norm) of a particular response from this ideal response. Additionally, we switch to using
curved Likert interpretation, i.e. {0, 0.2, 2, 3.8, 4} instead of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, which captures
a notion of psychological distance between Likert items by overcoming the middle-of-scale
effect [39]. Thus, for each bias, lower the L1-norm, better is the inclination towards that
particular bias. It is worth noting that this method of comparing responses is identical
to simply comparing the aggregate scores, where a higher aggregate score means better
inclination towards the bias. However, we feel the former description provides a more
intuitive understanding of why we choose to use this particular measure for agreement
between responses.
The aggregate score that we computed in the previous paragraph, provides an absolute
measurement of each bias. That is, it helps compare and rank across responses for each
bias, but is inadequate for comparing responses between biases, as the effect of some bi-
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ases may be more pronounced than others. Therefore, we have the need to rescale these
aggregate scores for different biases by multiplying weights, so that they can be rendered
comparable to each other. This is important since our ultimate aim is to calculate the
agents’ utilities derived from each of these biases, and hence the overall utility from all
biases combined.
We obtain the scaling weights from question 35 of the survey, that inquires about the
respondent’s relative preferences across all four biases. Let us denote the values reported
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5.4.3 Calculating and Discounting Discomfort from Total Utility
Questions 35 and 36 from the survey elicit very specific information from respondents. In
question 36, we ask the respondents of the maximum amount by which they would be
willing to increase their thermostat temperatures, assuming that policies incorporating all
the considered biases are implemented together. This information registers the maximum
temperature ∆Tmax that the respondent is willing to have their thermostat increased by.
Let us call this respondent agent i. Based on the statement of the question, we can assume
that the net utility obtained by agent i from all the biases exactly nullifies the discomfort
experienced at ∆Tmax. We can then calculate Πi(P




in ◦ (wSi , wCi , wGi , wNi ))(Si, Ci, Ni, Gi)ᵀ − di(∆Tmax)
where αi is a scaling constant.
Recall from chapter 3, that we can calculate d(∆Tmax) as follows:
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di(∆Tmax) =
0 if ∆T ≤ 1.6(0.306)(∆T )− 0.48 if ∆T > 1.6
Since the utility from all biases cancels out the utility from discomfort at ∆Tmax, we
set Πi(P
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Finally, we can compute the utility of agent i at any given temperature change ∆T and
incentives P in using the following equation:
Πi(P
in,∆T ) = αi(P
in ◦ (wSi , wCi , wGi , wNi ))(Si, Ci, Ni, Gi)ᵀ − di(∆T )
5.4.4 Principal’s Action and Optimal Policy Model
A part of the principal’s (utility company’s) action is the temperature increase signals it
sends to the agents’ thermostat controller. Assuming that the principal sends the same
temperature increase signal to all the agents, we now investigate the impact of inclusion
or exclusion of each non-cash incentive in our policy. This lets us find the policy for
which the principal maximizes its energy saving objective. We define the energy saving ob-
jective as the product of the number of participants and the signaled temperature increase.
We present our results based on data from 425 participants. The absolute values
presented in our results would scale accordingly, if the target population is larger. Further,
we base our results on the assumption that the cost of implementation of incentives is zero,
since we do not have data about what these costs might be. In practice, the gains from
each policy will need to be balanced by the implementation cost (per user) for that policy.
We consider all the 16 possible combinations of policy incentives that can be imple-
mented. For each of these policy sets, we calculate the temperature increase signal for
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Figure 5.8: Optimal ∆T for each incentive policy. We use the notation C for commitment
device, S for status quo bias, G for gamification and N for social norm.
which that policy set attains its maximum participation and maximum energy saving ob-
jective. We find that for the policy sets incorporating all four incentives, the energy saving
objective is maximized at a temperature increase of 2◦C. For all other non-empty policy
sets, the principal’s energy saving objective is maximized at a lower value of ∆T . Fig-
ure 5.8 shows a plot of the optimal ∆T across policy sets. From among other policy sets,
{C,S,G} and {S,N,G} record a better optimal ∆T of 1.8◦C.
Figure 5.9 shows plots of optimal energy saving objective (or principal’s objective) and
participation across policy sets, and optimal energy saving objective vs. policy set respec-
tively, at these optimal ∆T signals. From the plots, it can be observed that implementing
all the incentives in the policy results in the maximum energy saving objective of 542◦C,
summed over all participants. It should be noted that, in this case, the participation is
the lowest – showing that it is important to identify sections of the population that react
positively to these policies, allowing for higher ∆T .
Figure 5.10 shows a plots of how the principal’s objective and the participation vary with
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Figure 5.9: Participation rate (bottom graph) and principal’s objective as a function of the
optimal ∆T for each incentive policy (top graph). Where C denotes commitment device,
S denotes status quo bias, G denotes gamification and N denotes social norm.
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Figure 5.10: Change in participation rate (bottom graph) and principal’s utility (top graph)
as a function of ∆T when all incentives are used.
change in ∆T , for the policy set implementing all policies. As is expected, participation
drops as ∆T increases. The principal’s objective is maximized at 2◦C. Sharp drops in the
plot of λ∆T are observed due to granularity of survey data.
To study the marginal utility of each incentive in each policy set, we plot the marginals
using a Hasse diagram, showed in Figure 5.11. For a policy maker, this diagram is designed
to provide key insights, as it depicts the marginal improvements in utility for all possible
combinations of incentives and policy sets – particularly, since our results are based on the
assumption that the cost of implementation of incentives is zero.
In the Hasse diagram, the nodes represent policy sets and the edges represent marginal
utilities (in terms of the principal’s objective i.e. λ∆T ). Nodes appear in four levels,
based on the number of incentives they contain. Incentives are color-coded. The colors
red, green, blue, and yellow, respectively represent incentives from commitment, status
quo, social norms, and gamification. The Hasse diagram may be read starting from the
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bottom-most node (the empty policy set). As we move up, incentives are added into the
nodes and the edges leading to those nodes (from below) reflect the marginal utility of
the respective color-coded incentive. The marginal utilities of all incentives are equal,
if the policy sets contain exactly one incentive. This shows that when only one incen-
tive is offered, the discomfort factor dominates, i.e., agents make their decisions based
solely on their discomfort preferences. If we add more incentives, we start observing dif-
ferent marginal utilities for different incentives, based on the preferences of the agents.
When exactly two incentives are provided, the policy sets {Commitment, Status quo},
{Status quo, Social Norms}, and {Status quo,Gamification} outperform others. This
clearly shows that marginal utility from adding Status quo bias is greater than other bi-
ases. In the case the policy sets have exactly three incentives, if we inspect edges joining
the nodes (with three incentives) from below, the green edges representing Status quo bias
have significantly higher values than other edges – showing that the marginal contribution
of the Status quo bias was the highest. This reflects in the values of the net utility of these
policy sets as well, as {Commitment, Social norms,Gamification} performs the worst –
with the other three policy sets having approximately similar total utility. To summarize,
this shows that {Status quo} bias has the greatest impact among the four incentives that
we studied.
If the principal sends non-uniform signals, its objective can be further maximized. Since
the principal already has the values of ∆Tmax for each participant from the survey (Q36),
it may directly send these values as signals to the respective agents. In that case, ac-
cording to our data from 425 participants, the gains for the principal would be 967◦C,
which is roughly 78% higher than the case where the principal sends identical tempera-
ture change signals. However, for practically implementing non-uniform signals, survey
responses must be obtained for each participant from the target population so that their
individual preferences can be clearly estimated. Although, conducting such a survey for
the entire population could be expensive.
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Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we showed that energy policies can significantly benefit from behavioral
research. To our knowledge, this is the first game-theoretic and data-driven analysis that
quantifies and models the role of behavioral incentives in designing energy policies. Our
most important contributions have been laying the framework for comparing and contrast-
ing the efficacy of policies, identifying how target population sections respond to individual
policies, and hence proposing an evidence-based approach for decision-making in policy de-
sign. Our proposed methodologies provide policy makers with the necessary tools to make
wise and informed choices.
With respect to our specific problem instantiation of peaksaver PLUS penetration, we
showed that the utility companies can make a homogeneous increase in thermostat tem-
peratures by up to 2◦C for targeted sections of the population. Further, financial viability
admitting, the utility companies may elicit preferences from the entire population enabling
them to send heterogeneous signals. Our computations suggest that heterogeneous signals
can achieve about 78% more energy savings.
To obtain ground truth data, we designed and conducted a survey. We also recom-
mended a subset of questions from our questionnaire that can be used for gauging the
participants’ stimuli to commitment devices, status quo bias, social norms, and gamifica-
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tion; and how these biases relate to thermal discomfort. We proposed a post hoc survey
cleaning methodology that ensures higher reliability of data. This is particularly impor-
tant for surveys that aim to elicit psychological or behavioral preferences, as the inherent
concepts that we try to quantify are abstract in nature – thus providing more structure to
the art of designing psychometric surveys.
It is worthy of note that our survey results are based on responses from all across
Canada and the United States. Within the scope of our research study, we conducted the
survey on a sample population of 425, obtained from an original data set of 990 responses.
However, both in principle and practice, our propositions are highly scalable. Which is
why we coin the term “Big Data Mechanism Design” for our work. With adequate support
from government authorities and administrations, we envisage our model and policy to be
implementable on a large scale with millions of people participating. Further, a similar
baseline approach can be used to verify, compare, and work with other newer policies –
possibly in domains other than energy. Thus, our work also carries a broader appeal to
policy makers in general.
Due to various theoretical and practical constraints, we made some assumptions to
tractably study the problem. These assumptions pose some limitations on our proposed
models and methodologies. We assumed that the agents’ utility depends only on the bi-
ases and thermal discomfort. In reality, the agents’ utility could depend on other external
factors too. Also, in calculating the net utility, we assume that the utility from biases
and discomfort are additive and linear. This assumption was critical in quantifying the
utility from biases, but it was also the most naive way to formulate the utility model. A
better model for formulating the utility functions could indeed exist. As for the behavior
of the agents, we made the standard game-theoretic assumption that they are individually
rational and that they participate if and only if their utility is non-negative (a weakly dom-
inant strategy). From the principal’s point of view, we assume that it would implement
a policy based on its expected energy savings. Although this is a reasonable assumption,
due to lack of data we were unable to factor in the cost of policy implementation – an
important factor in the principal’s decision making. Instead, we provide the policy makers
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with information regarding the marginal benefit of adding or subtracting incentives to the
policy. Ultimately, the credibility of our results are greatly dependent on the correctness
of our survey elicitation procedure and our instantiation of the PMV model.
Prospects for future work based on our current study are numerous. We tried clustering
agent types based on their utility from different biases, albeit with limited success. Further
investigation in the direction of using machine learning approaches could yield interesting
results. For example, one could take a completely computational approach and train a
classifier to determine agent participation, instead of relying on a utility model. This
method, however, would require collecting data on an even larger scale to avoid overfitting
concerns. We elicited a small set of features through our survey, and likely missed some
important features like potentially useful demographic information, unaccounted psycho-
logical and economic variables, etc. A larger and richer dataset could present more valuable
insights. Other directions for future research could include extensions in domains of policy
making outside of the energy sector, and mechanisms for studying treatment of a multi-
ple customized policies for targeted sections of the population (neither homogeneous nor
completely heterogeneous). Also, surveys, as a method for preference elicitation, could
be replaced by more elaborate field experiments. Data from field experiments could help
calibrate the degree of response bias that might be implicitly prevalent in survey data.
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Information about the survey
Page 2
Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
1. By selecting “yes” as an answer to survey question 1 below, you agree: 
 
(i) to have read and understood the information presented in this letter. 
(ii) that you are aware that you may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time by 
simply not completing the online survey. 
(iii) have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study and receive 
satisfactory answers to your questions, and any additional details you may have wanted.  
(iv) to being at least 18 years old. 
 
Please confirm that you understood the purpose and conditions of the study and with full 
knowledge of all foregoing, agree of your own free will, to participate in this study. 






Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
2. Do you have a thermostat in your house?
3. How is your electricity bill determined?











Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
5. Suppose you and your friend agree to go to the gym together, a few times a week. How 
likely are you to?
6. Suppose you promised yourself that you would read more books. How likely are you to 
follow through?
7. When you commit to do something, in general, how often do you carry it out?
8. Suppose you are on a diet. How likely are you to successfully resist that extra piece of 
cake?
9. How likely are you to successfully abstain from browsing online, and instead 
concentrate on work?
10. How good are you at resisting temptations, in general?
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the sun is bigger than 
the earth.
 
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Never Rarely Sometimes Most of the Time Always
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very bad Bad Neither good nor bad Good Very good
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or disagree Agree Strongly agree
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
12. Imagine that you inherited some money, and this money was already in a moderate­risk 
investment. Assuming that you wish to keep the money invested, how likely would you 
change how the money is invested.
13. Suppose you got a new mobile phone. How likely are you to change the default 
ringtone?
14. While grocery shopping, how likely are you to stick to the same brand of milk every 
time?
15. To what extent would you agree or disagree with the statement, "I usually use the 
same travel website to make my travel bookings."
16. All of us commute to work or school everyday. Many avail public transport like buses. 
The mode of transport may have an effect on how people feel when they reach 
work/school. To ensure good quality responses, we sometimes include questions that tell 
us if a participant was serious about the answers. To show that you understand this, 
please ignore everything else in this question and select only the Forgiving option below.
17. Another bank is offering a slightly higher interest rate on savings, as compared to your 
bank. How likely are you to move your savings account to this other bank?
 
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely













































Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
18. Suppose an acquaintance of yours invited you to a dinner party. How likely are you to 
bring a gift, for e.g., a bottle of wine or flowers?
19. If others around you are tipping the waiter, how likely are you to leave a tip as well?
20. To what extent do you agree with the statement "Five dollars plus fifteen dollars is 
equal to three dollars."
21. How likely are you to participate in an activity if others around you are also 
participating? For example, the Ice Bucket Challenge.
22. To what extent do you care what people around you think of you?
 
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree or disagree Agree Strongly agree
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very little A little Neither little nor much Much Very much
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
23. To what extent do you find public endorsements such as Facebook "Likes" gratifying?
24. How much do you like earning stars with Starbucks coffee, or a chance at a lottery with 
Tim Horton's coffee?
25. To what extent do you appreciate reputation points on online communities?
26. How likely are you to use Shopper's cards with reward points?
27. To what extent do you think feedback mechanisms like grades, employee ratings, etc. 
make (have made) you push harder to perform better?
 
Very little A little Neither little nor much Much Very much
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very little A little Neither little nor much Much Very much
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very little A little Neither little nor much Much Very much
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very little A little Neither little nor much Much Very much
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
28. During the summer (Jun to Aug), on an average, how many weeks per month is 
nobody home? (for e.g. out on vacation etc.)
29. In summer (Jun to Aug), on an average, how many weeks per month is nobody home 
during the afternoon (from 3pm to 6pm)?




















nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
31. What is your usual thermostat (or air conditioner) setting during summer afternoons 
(between 3pm and 6pm)? You may choose more than one option.
32. How often during a day does your thermostat temperature setting change, either 
manually or due to a programmed setting?
33. How likely do you think the hottest day of summer will be colder than the coldest day 
of winter?
34. How easy/hard is it for occupants of your residence to agree on a single temperature 
setting?
 
Does not change Changes 1 or 2 times Changes 3 or 4 times Changes 5 or 6 times Changes more than 6 times
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Not likely Less likely As likely as not Very likely Definitely
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Very easy Easy Neither easy nor hard Hard Very hard














































Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
35. To the best of your ability, please consider each of the following scenarios as 
independent situations while answering.





















nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
How many degrees warmer could your thermostat be adjusted during summer afternoons (3PM to 
6PM) before you would get up and change it?























nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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Preferences regarding everyday scenarios and home thermostat settings
37. Please enter your CrowdFlower Contributor ID.
 
38. Lastly, it is important to our study that we only include responses from people who 
devoted their full attention to this study.  
 
Your answer to this question will not affect your payment in any manner whatsoever.  
 












B.1 Social Comparison Scale
The social comparison scale [54] is a short version of the INCOM scale [29]. It deals with
two distinctive underlying dimensions of social comparisons: (a) comparisons of abilities
referring to the question “How am I doing as compared to others?”, and (b) comparisons
of opinions referring to the question “How do my feelings/thoughts compare to those of
others?” In particular, the scale consists of the following questions seeking responses on
the Likert scale [44] ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”:
1. I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do
things.
2. I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other
people.
3. I am not the type of person who often compares with others.
4. I am not the type of person who often compares with others.I often try to find out
what others think who face similar problems as I face.
5. I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do.
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6. If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about
it.
B.2 HEXACO & the Big Five Inventory Scales
The HEXACO [41] and the Big Five Inventory [33] scales claim to measure fundamental
personality traits along different dimensions. The Big Five Inventory measures personality
traits along the following five dimensions:
1. Extraversion vs. introversion: Correlated behavioral qualities along this dimension
include gregariousness, assertiveness, activity (energetic), excitement-seeking, enthu-
siastic, outgoing nature, etc.
2. Agreeableness vs. antagonism: Correlated behavioral qualities include trust, straight-
forwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, Tender-mindedness, etc.
3. Conscientiousness vs. lack of direction: Correlated behavioral qualities include com-
petence, order (organized), dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, deliber-
ation (not impulsive), etc.
4. Neuroticism vs. emotional stability: Correlated behavioral qualities include anxiety,
angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, vulnerability (not self-
confident), etc.
5. Openness vs. exclusiveness to experience: Correlated behavioral qualities include cu-
rious, fantasy (imaginative), aesthetics (artistic), wide interests, feelings (excitable),
unconventional, etc.
The set of personality traits considered by the HEXACO scale is a superset of the
Big Five Inventory, with the additional dimension of Honesty-Humility. This additional
dimension represents traits like manipulative behavior for personal gain, temptation to
break rules, lack of interest in lavish wealth and luxuries, feeling no special entitlement to
elevated social status, etc.
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B.3 Self-Monitoring Scale
Self-monitoring scale [42] measures the respondent’s sensitivity to the expressive behavior
of others, and their ability to modify self-presentation.
A representative set of questions from the self-monitoring scale follow:
1. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
2. Although I know myself, I find that others do not know me.
3. Different people tend to have different impressions about the type of person I am.
4. I’m not always the person I appear to be.
5. I’m pretty good at entertaining people with jokes, anecdotes, and stories.
6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
7. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no infor-
mation.
8. I have a quick wit.
9. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
10. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end).
11. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (C)’b
12. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.
13. It’s important to me to fit into the group I’m with.
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B.4 Self-Efficacy Scale
Jerusalem and Schwarzer devised the General Self-efficacy scale [55]. The scale consists
of ten items and, as its name indicates, was created to assess a general sense of perceived
self-efficacy. Specifically, the scale seeks answers to the extent to which the respondent
agrees to the following statements:
1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
B.5 Self-Control Scale
The self-control scales, proposed in [60], look quite relevant; particularly because com-
mitment bias is known to be linked with the ability to overcome temptations [21]. Some
relevant questions from the self-control scales are as follows:
1. I am good at resisting temptation.
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2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits.
3. I am lazy.
4. I say inappropriate things.
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun.
6. People can count on me to keep on schedule.
7. People would describe me as impulsive.
8. I refuse things that are bad for me.
9. I spend too much money.
10. I wish I had more self-discipline.
11. I am reliable.
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Appendix C
Custom JavaScript for CrowdFlower
if(! cf cml.digging gold) {
CMLFormValidator.addAllThese([
[’yext no international url’, {
errorMessage: function(){
return (’Insert code from survey.’);
},
validate: function(element, props){
// METHOD TO VALIDATE must return true or false














// This is the method that will evaluate your validation
// value is the user submitted content of the form element that you are validating
function METHOD TO VALIDATE(element) {
var ipreq = new XMLHttpRequest();
ipreq.open(”GET”, ”https://www.telize.com/jsonip”, false);
ipreq.send();
if (ipreq.status === 200) {
var ipjson = JSON.parse(ipreq.responseText);
ip = ipjson[”ip”];
}
var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
request.open(”GET”, ”https: / / blizzard.cs.uwaterloo.ca / apat / thesis-survey /
test.php?ip = ” + ip + ”&enteredValue = ” + element.value, false);
request.send();
if (request.status === 200) {
var responsejson = JSON.parse(request.responseText);
return responsejson[”responseBoolean”];
}
}
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